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DIRECTORATE OF
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
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Cambodia: Government forces are still consolidating their control over Kompong Thom.

Earlier Cambodian Army claims that the city was entirely in government hands seem to have been inaccurate; some enemy elements reportedly were still holding out in its northern sector yesterday. A large concentration of enemy troops was also reported to be south of Kompong Thom, and air strikes were made there. Press accounts claim that Cambodian and South Vietnamese helicopters are continuing to shuttle supplies to the isolated city.

In Kompong Cham Province, Skoun remains in Communist hands. Government forces, supported by air strikes, were maneuvering east and west of the town yesterday. Enemy strength in the Skoun area apparently has increased to an estimated 800 troops. East of Skoun, elements of two government battalions were trying on 4 August to dislodge the enemy from the small town of Prey Totung, on Route 7. Government forces must clear the Communists out of Skoun and Prey Totung in order to facilitate overland access from Phnom Penh to Kompong Cham city.

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[redacted] Kompong Cham was struck by 122-mm. rocket fire on 3 August. No damage resulted, however. [redacted]

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[redacted] there were nine launching positions for such weapons located north of the city. If true, this would mark the Communists' first known use of this weapon in Cambodia. The last major enemy attack on Kompong Cham was in mid-May.

Elsewhere, a large government convoy from the recently abandoned post at Thmar Keo, in northwest Kompong Speu Province, continued its slow movement southward toward Route 4. Communist harassing attacks reportedly have destroyed 14 vehicles in the convoy. A relief convoy that has been trying to move north from Route 4 to link up with the Thmar Keo evacuees has also been slowed by enemy attacks and extremely muddy roads. [redacted]

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Communist Activity Remains Light



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South Vietnam: Action in the ground war remains generally light throughout most of the country, but the Communists have become more active in several localities during the past few days.

In the lower Mekong Delta, the increased enemy harassing attacks that began over the weekend have continued, bringing the number of recent shellings in that area to more than 30. The Communists also have attacked a number of outposts in the upper delta in recent days. One engagement in Dinh Tuong Province, which resulted in nine South Vietnamese and 44 Communists killed, was one of the heaviest actions of recent weeks. This activity appears to fall into the pattern of limited monthly flare-ups noted in the delta for some time.


The Communists also have recently carried out limited but sharp assaults against allied outposts farther north near Da Lat and Kham Duc in the highlands and near Phan Thiet along the coast, causing nearly 65 allied casualties. [redacted]

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Burma: Government counterguerrilla efforts in the northeast may be complicated by a recent agreement between a large group of tribal insurgents and the Communists.

A leftist faction of the Kachin Independence Army and Burmese Communist forces along the Chinese border reportedly signed a united front agreement in mid-June, after intermittent negotiations. The accord represents, at least in part, a cease-fire between the two long-hostile forces. It remains to be seen whether its provisions for greater cooperation prove to be more durable than those in earlier understandings that soon foundered over Communist encroachments into Kachin territory.

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Arab States: A five-nation conference of Arab foreign and defense ministers finally convened in Tripoli yesterday despite the refusal of Iraq and Algeria to attend.

The precise purpose of the meeting--which includes representatives from Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Jordan, and Syria--is not clear. Egypt's semiofficial newspaper Al Ahram has said that the talks would concern ways to strengthen the "eastern front" against Israel, and that the US plan would not be the primary topic. The participants will almost certainly attempt, however, to hammer out some kind of joint strategy in the light of the prospective cease-fire and negotiations.

The conference, originally slated to open last Monday, was postponed to give Libyan Prime Minister Qaddafi a chance to try to persuade Iraq to participate. Baghdad has vociferously denounced Cairo's acceptance of the US peace proposal as a sell-out of the Arab cause, and subsequent exchanges between the two countries have been bitter. The Soviets will presumably urge a high-level Iraqi delegation now visiting Moscow to mute Baghdad's criticism of the US plan.

Following Qaddafi's return, the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council issued a somewhat inconsistent statement ruling out negotiations, peace, or recognition of Israel, but announcing full support for Egypt and denouncing all attacks on Nasir. Libya also promised that it would continue to supply funds and arms to the fedayeen resistance movement led by Fatah as long as it pursued the "true road" of Palestinian liberation.

The Sudan's policy has generally followed Cairo's lead, but has been somewhat more forthcoming toward the fedayeen. Khartoum promptly endorsed Egypt's acceptance of the US plan, but it also announced that representatives of the Palestinian

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movement will be allowed to use Sudanese radio facilities, presumably under some kind of censorship. President Numayri almost certainly has checked this move with Nasir, as the Sudan is too concerned with maintaining its ties with Egypt to fly in the face of Cairo's wishes. Nasir may want to provide more moderate fedayeen elements with a propaganda outlet to counter the attacks from Iraq. At the same time, his refusal to allow the fedayeen to broadcast from Egypt enables him to give the appearance of full backing for the peace initiative. [redacted]

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UN - Middle East: The annual report of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) graphically reveals the dimensions of the agency's problem in providing services to the refugee camps of the Middle East.

The 1969 General Assembly did nothing to resolve UNRWA's financial squeeze brought about by the steady rise in program expenses, and subsequent appeals by Secretary General Thant for voluntary contributions have received only a meager response. The UNRWA report now forecasts a complete breakdown in UNRWA's services unless additional sources of revenue are forthcoming. Projections based on the estimated \$9 million deficit for the 1969-70 period indicate that UNRWA's cash reserves will be exhausted by September 1971. Officials of the agency have made some cuts in their health, education, and supplementary feeding programs, but will not make major reductions pending possible action by the General Assembly this fall.

The report notes the steady politicization of the refugee community--especially in Lebanon--and cites numerous signs that the fedayeen will henceforth expect to be consulted on UNRWA matters in the same manner that the Arab host governments have heretofore been consulted. To date there has been no request for fedayeen participation in UNRWA meetings, but both Lebanon and Jordan stated in June that the fedayeen should be entitled to such representation.

The UN Secretariat is certain to raise the financial plight of UNRWA at the upcoming General Assembly, and the resulting debate is likely to be especially heated. Last year's Arab-Israeli exchange on the subject at the Assembly was acerbic, and focused hardly at all on the budgetary problem. The fedayeen role in the camps has become more prominent since then.

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Ceylon: Prime Minister Bandaranaike's recent anti-Western policy measures have caused some criticism within her government. A high-level delegation that included two moderate cabinet ministers called on Mrs. Bandaranaike this week to express concern. The delegation reportedly emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the aid-supplying Western nations and proposed several public relations measures to improve the new government's image abroad. Mrs. Bandaranaike was noncommittal to these suggestions, however. When questioned about the suspension of relations with Israel, the prime minister admitted that the timing of this decision had been influenced by her irritation over pressure from Jewish-owned firms in England. Such emotional reactions may continue to play an important part in her foreign policy decisions. [redacted]

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Singapore: Leftist terrorists in Singapore during the past week bombed two community centers and set fire to three buses. Low-level terrorist activities began in March with the bombing of a community center, and in mid-June resulted in the burning of a bus. These actions have caused very few casualties and are treated by the Singapore authorities as more of a nuisance than a threat. They are also possibly counterproductive for Singapore's weak leftist movement because they give the efficient security forces a convenient excuse for arresting more members of the local pro-Communist party.

[redacted]

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
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Bahamas: Acting Prime Minister Hanna appears to have become more relaxed about US plans to dispose of obsolete nerve gas in the Atlantic. He evidently is somewhat reassured by the UK's efforts to look into the matter. In a discussion with the US consul general on 4 August, Hanna indicated that if a proposed team of British experts agreed with the US as to safety considerations, his government would be "inclined" to accept the decision. Hanna initially had condemned the disposal project as an "unfriendly" act. [redacted]

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Cuba - Trinidad and Tobago: Havana continues to demonstrate its interest in developing contacts with other Caribbean countries. Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Eric Williams has announced that a six- or seven-man delegation from Cuba would arrive in Port of Spain on 10 August for a stay of undetermined length. The visitors--mostly agricultural experts--reportedly will concern themselves primarily with agricultural and industrial development. A similar group from Cuba went to Trinidad and Tobago last December, and a delegation from Port of Spain was given Fidel Castro's personal attention in Cuba last February when it repaid the visit. [redacted]

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